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Abstract
An extended analysis is made of the Gell-Mann and Hartle axioms for a gen-
eralised ‘histories’ approach to quantum theory. Emphasis is placed on finding
equivalents of the lattice structure that is employed in standard quantum logic.
Particular attention is given to ‘quasi-temporal’ theories in which the notion of
time-evolution is less rigid than in conventional Hamiltonian physics; theories of
this type are expected to arise naturally in the context of quantum gravity and
quantum field theory in a curved space-time. The quasi-temporal structure is
coded in a partial semi-group of ‘temporal supports’ that underpins the lattice of
history propositions. Non-trivial examples include quantum field theory on a non
globally-hyperbolic spacetime, and a simple cobordism approach to a theory of
quantum topology.
It is shown how the set of history propositions in standard quantum theory
can be realised in such a way that each history proposition is represented by
a genuine projection operator. This provides valuable insight into the possible
lattice structure in general history theories, and also provides a number of potential
models for theories of this type.
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminary remarks
A good illustration of the great difficulty encountered when attempting to construct a
fully comprehensive account of quantum gravity is the striking lack of anything remotely
resembling an ‘axiomatic’ scheme for such a theory. The point at stake is not one of
mathematical rigour per se, but rather the need for a clear statement about what one
is really trying to do. This uncertainty is reflected in the wide range of declared views
on how to approach the subject and, indeed, on what would constitute a successful
resolution of the problem.
The lack of any quasi-axiomatic scheme is regretable, but hardly surprising, not least
because of the frequently expressed view that the well-developed space-time concepts of
classical general relativity may be inappropriate at scales of the Planck length and time.
One example is the well-known ‘problem of time’ that arises in attempts to construct
a canonical theory of quantum gravity 1. This problem first appears in the canonical
approach to classical general relativity where the notion of time as an external parameter
disappears and has to be recovered in some way from the internal contents of the system.
In the analogous quantum theory opinions differ on whether (i) the concept of ‘time’ is
fundamental; or (ii) our normal idea of time is a coarse-grained concept that emerges only
above the Planck scale in a theory of quantum gravity that is fundamentally ‘timeless’.
In the former case, a major issue is whether the identification of an internal time should
be made before, or after, quantisation. Not unsurprisingly, the problem of time is of
major importance in quantum cosmology, particularly in attempts to describe the origin
of the universe as some type of quantum-mechanical event.
One of the more adventurous suggestions for resolving this issue was made recently
by Gell-Mann and Hartle in the context of the ‘consistent histories’ approach to quantum
theory. The consistent histories programme for standard quantum theory is currently
generating substantial interest, inspired mainly by a major series of papers by Gell-Mann
and Hartle [7, 8, 6, 14, 15, 9, 16] which partly follow on from, and are partly independent
of, seminal work by Griffiths [11] and by Omne`s [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35].
This new perspective on quantum theory is of importance for a variety of reasons,
not least of which is the possibility it affords of escaping the thralls of the Copenhagen
interpretation with its infamous measurement problem and associated concept of state-
vector reduction induced by an external observer. Whether or not this hope is justified
has been the subject of much, sometimes acrimonious, debate, although most workers in
the field agree that, at the very least, the idea of consistent histories provides valuable
insight into the relation between classical physics and quantum physics and, in particular,
the sense in which the former may be said to ‘emerge’ from the latter.
However, the motivation of the present paper is not a desire to elude the clutches of
1For recent reviews see [20, 18].
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Copenhagen epistemology but rather the suggestion of Gell-Mann and Hartle to use the
methodology of consistent histories to tackle the problem of time in quantum gravity. At
a first glance, it seems odd to address the problem of time using the notion of ‘history’,
a concept that is surely intrinsically temporal? But Gell-Mann and Hartle refute this
by asserting that a ‘history’ need not necessarily be regarded as a time-ordered string
of events or propositions: it could appear as a fundamental theoretical entity in its own
right.
A simple example [16] of this idea is given by a globally-hyperbolic Lorentzian metric
γ on a manifold M. Any such space-time can be expressed (in a variety of ways) as
a one-parameter t (time) family of Riemannian geometries gt on a spatial manifold Σ
with, topologically, M ≃ Σ × IR. In this sense, γ is a possible history of the universe:
i.e., a path t 7→ gt in the infinite-dimensional space of 3-geometries on Σ. But suppose
now that γ is not globally hyperbolic. The notion of time is still well-defined locally on
(M, γ) but, since there are no global time functions, it is no longer possible to interpret γ
as a temporal sequence of three-geometries; however, γ may still be perfectly acceptable
as a space-time geometry, and hence as a ‘generalised history’ of the universe. Note that
a metric of this type may still possess some spacelike hypersurfaces that divide M into
two pieces and, to that extent, some global time structure remains. This is an example
of what I shall call a quasi-temporal situation.
This example of Hartle is a mild one, but it illustrates the main point well: in
classical or quantum gravity a ‘history’ is simply a potential configuration for the universe
as a whole, including any quasi space-time structure it may possess. This raises a
number of fascinating possibilities in which the class of possible universes is deemed
to be something considerably more exotic than a collection of non globally-hyperbolic
Lorentzian geometries. An example would be a quantum topology theory in which the
histories include different point-set topologies with the idea that the smooth manifold
structure of classical general relativity emerges only in some coarse-grained sense.
1.2 The main problems
The main challenge, and the focus of the present paper, is to translate these rather
vague ideas into a concrete mathematical form. What we seek is a quantum history
framework that is as mathematically well-formulated as are, for example, the various
well-known axiomatisations of standard quantum theory. Of course, any such formalism
must reproduce the standard theory where this is appropriate but, hopefully, the axioms
will also admit realisations that are very different. This applies in particular to theories of
quantum space-time structure where the mathematical apparatus of standard quantum
theory (Hilbert spaces, self-adjoint operators, etc) could well be among the things that
‘emerge’ at a suitably coarse-grained level.
The approach adopted in the present paper is motivated by the presentation by Gell-
Mann and Hartle of a set of generalised axioms for a quantum theory based on histories
and decoherence functionals. My aim is to construct a refinement of these axioms using
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techniques drawn from the ‘quantum logic’ approach to standard quantum theory. Thus
we are looking for a history-based, quantum gravity analogue of something like, for
example, the Mackey [22] or Jauch-Piron axioms [19, 36]. Following the seminal work of
Von Neumann and Birkhoff [41], most approaches to quantum logic 2 have concentrated
on the lattice 3 structure of the set L of propositions concerning the state of a physical
system at a single time. In realisations based on a Hilbert space H, the lattice L is
identified with the set P (H) of projection operators on H (or, equivalently, with the set
of all closed linear subspaces of H). Time evolution appears as an automorphism of the
lattice; in a Hilbert space model this is implemented by the familiar family t 7→ U(t) :=
e−iHt of unitary operators. In classical physics the lattice of propositions is a Boolean
algebra, but in quantum theory this is no longer the case since distributivity is lost: a
feature that seems to accurately reflect most of the peculiar features of the quantum
world.
The second ingredient in standard quantum logic is the space R of quantum states.
In a Hilbert space realisation this is identified with the set of density matrices. The
different axiomatisations vary on whether the primary focus is placed on L or on R but,
in all cases, a dual relation is posited between these spaces where the pairing < ρ, P >
of a state ρ ∈ R with a proposition P ∈ L is identified physically as the probability that
P will be true if the state is ρ.
The proposal to use quantum logic in the consistent histories formalism is not new;
indeed, Omne`s invoked such ideas in his seminal work. However, his main aim was to
show that any situation in which histories decohere admits a sensible physical description
using standard Boolean logic, whereas my goal is quite different. I am not concerned
with the mechanism of decoherence as such—nor with the interpretational nuances of
quantum physics—but wish rather to explore the basic mathematical structure that
might be assigned to the spaces of histories and decoherence functionals. Thus, in what
follows, references to quantum ‘logic’ should not be read as inferring that physical events
must necessarily be described using a non-standard form of logic; the implication is only
that the set of histories may possess a type of algebraic structure that is similar to
the lattices used in standard quantum logic. In particular, I do not wish to become
embroiled in the peristalithic debate about whether logic itself is empirical or a priori !
Most studies of quantum logic have involved propositions at a single time and there-
fore are not directly applicable to the case in hand. A notable exception is the work of
Mittelstaedt and Stachow [24, 25, 39, 40] who developed a general theory of the logic of
sequential propositions using sequential conjunctions of the type ‘A is true and then B
is true and then . . .’, plus other temporal connectives such as ‘or then’ and ‘sequential
implication’. One conclusion was that the appropriate mathematical tool for describing
sequential propositions is a Baer-* semiring [39]: a mathematical structure that is closely
connected with what is done in standard quantum theory using the history formalism.
2An excellent general introduction is [2].
3One can also employ the weaker concept of an orthomodular partially ordered set; for a recent
general exposition see [37]. It should be possible to develop a history analogue of this using the ideas
in the present paper.
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The approach adopted in the present paper can be considered in some respects as an
extension of the work of Mittelstaedt and Stachow in a way that takes more account of
the temporal labels and which thereby admits an extension to quasi-temporal situations.
A key ingredient is the observation that the statement that a certain universe (i.e.,
history) is ‘realised’ is itself a proposition, and therefore the set of all such histories
might possess a lattice structure analogous to the lattice of single-time propositions in
standard quantum logic. In particular, a history proposition might be representable by
a projection operator in some Hilbert space.
It must be emphasised that representing histories with projection operators is pre-
cisely what does not happen in the usual approach to standard quantum theory. The
central object of interest is the so-called decoherence functional (see (2.8)), in whose
calculation the history α corresponding to single-time propositions αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn at
times t1 < t2 < . . . < tn is associated with the ‘C-representation’ defined as Ĉα :=
α̂tn(tn)α̂tn−1(tn−1) . . . α̂t1(t1): a product of (Heisenberg picture) projection operators
α̂tk(tk) that is usually not itself a projection operator. This confuses the logical analysis
of the system. For example, if α and β are disjoint 4 histories the C-representative
Ĉα∨β of ‘history α or history β’ is always taken to be Ĉα + Ĉβ: a claim that is usually
justified by an appeal to a path-integral formalism. However, a deeper analysis might
want to deal with the problem in a more realisation-independent way, in which case the
statement Ĉα∨β = Ĉα+ Ĉβ is reminiscent of the standard quantum-logic result that if P
and Q are single-time, disjoint propositions, the projection operator that represents ‘P
or Q’ is P̂ + Q̂. But the assignment of Ĉα + Ĉβ cannot be justified in this simple way
if Ĉα or Ĉβ are not projection operators.
This problem becomes more acute if one asks for the C-representation of ‘α or β’
when α and β are not disjoint. The analogous question in quantum logic has a direct
answer—the proposition P ∨ Q is represented by the operator that projects onto the
closure of the linear span of the subspaces onto which P̂ and Q̂ project—but the answer
for histories is not obvious. A similar query attends the common identification of 1̂− Ĉα
as the C-representative of the proposition that the history is ‘not α’
The challenge in construcing a full axiomatic scheme for a quantum history structure
is four-fold:
1. Find a general set of axioms for a quantum history theory that has the same degree
of precision as one of the well-known axiomatic schemes for standard Hamiltonian
quantum theory. This scheme should be broad enough to admit quantum gravity
realisations in which the classical notions of space and time are not applicable.
2. If, as expected, the set of all history propositions has some sort of lattice structure,
study the way in which this differs from the standard quantum-logic lattices of
fixed-time propositions. In particular, what role is played by any ‘quasi-temporal’
properties of the system?
4This notion will be defined properly in Section 2
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3. Study the extent to which history propositions can be represented as projection
operators on some Hilbert space.
4. Study general ways of constructing realisations of the history axioms.
One of the tasks of the present paper is to construct a history version of standard
quantum theory in which every history is represented by a projection operator 5. The
usual logical operations on projection operators can then be applied to place a lattice
structure on the set of all history propositions. This provides some justification for
asserting that, in any history theory, the set of propositions about the histories should
have the structure of a non-distributive lattice, of which good models may be the lattices
of projection operators in a Hilbert space.
Of course, the challenge of quantum gravity may require realisations of the general
history axioms exist that do not involve Hilbert spaces in any way at all. On the
other hand, powerful reconstruction theorems in standard quantum theory show that
if the lattice L of single-time propositions satisfies certain plausible conditions it must
necessarily be realised as the lattice of subspaces of some (not necessarily complex)
Hilbert space. To avoid the analogue of this result in the history case, the algebraic
properties of the set of history propositions and the associated space of decoherence
functionals would have to differ in some significant way from those of the standard
lattice of single-time propositions and associated space of states.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start with a short exposition of the way
histories are used in standard Hamiltonian quantum theory, and of the axioms proposed
by Gell-Mann and Hartle. Then the search for a general set of history axioms begins
with the introduction of the notion of a temporal support for use in a theory that may
possess only quasi-temporal properties. This is based on the observation that one of the
most prominent features of a certain type of history (a history filter : a sort of sequential
conjunction) in standard quantum theory is that it can be decomposed into sub-histories
in which one sub-history ‘follows’ another. The claim is that the associated structure
of a partial semi-group is still present in the general case where it encodes whatever
quasi-temporal properties may be possessed by the system.
It is shown that the space of history filters possesses a natural lattice structure, but
this is not the correct one physically and only the ∧ semi-lattice sub-structure can be
retained. It is necessary therefore to embed the space of history filters into a larger space
of general ‘history propositions’ that carries the correct lattice structure. To validate
this crucial point, section 3 is devoted to the construction of a realisation of the logical
structure of standard quantum theory in which all history propositions are represented
by projection operators on a new Hilbert space. These results are then used to motivate a
tentative set of axioms for a general history theory with temporal supports. Relativistic
quantum field theory is discussed briefly in section 4, mainly as a way of illustrating the
5To avoid confusion it must be emphasised that the Hilbert space on which the histories are repre-
sented by projection operators is not the normal Hilbert space of the quantum theory.
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use of temporal supports in a quasi-temporal theory. The paper concludes with a short
account of some of the outstanding problems for further research.
2 The Search for General History Axioms
2.1 Histories in standard quantum theory
It will be helpful to begin by summarising very briefly how ‘histories’ are understood in
the conventional interpretation of an open, Hamiltonian quantum system that is subject
to measurements by an external, and essentially classical, observer.
To this end, let U(t1, t0) denote
6 the unitary time-evolution operator from time t0 to
t1; i.e., U(t1, t0) = e
−i(t1−t0)H/h¯. Then, in the Schro¨dinger picture, the density operator
state ρ(t0) at time t0 evolves in time t1 − t0 to ρ(t1), where
ρ(t1) = U(t1, t0)ρ(t0)U(t1, t0)
† = U(t1, t0)ρ(t0)U(t1, t0)
−1. (2.1)
Suppose that a measurement is made at time t1 of a property represented by a projection
operator P . Then the probability that the property will be found is
Prob(P = 1; ρ(t1)) = tr(Pρ(t1)) = tr(PU(t1, t0)ρ(t0)U(t1, t0)
†) = tr(P (t1)ρ(t0)) (2.2)
where
P (t1) := U(t1, t0)
†P (t0)U(t1, t0) (2.3)
is the Heisenberg picture operator defined with respect to the fiducial time t0. If the re-
sult of this measurement is kept then, according to the Von Neumann-Lu¨ders ‘reduction’
postulate, the appropriate density matrix to use for any further calculations is
ρred(t1) :=
P (t1)ρ(t0)P (t1)
tr(P (t1)ρ(t0))
. (2.4)
Now suppose a measurement is performed of a second observable Q at time t2 > t1.
Then, according to the above, the conditional probability of getting Q = 1 at time t2
given that P = 1 was found at time t1 (and that the original state was ρ(t0)) is
Prob(Q = 1|P = 1 at t1; ρ(t0)) = tr(Q(t2)ρred(t1)) =
tr(Q(t2)P (t1)ρ(t0)P (t1))
tr(P (t1)ρ(t0))
. (2.5)
The probability of getting P = 1 at t1 and Q = 1 at t2 is this conditional probability
multiplied by Prob(P = 1; ρ(t1)), i.e.,
Prob(P = 1 at t1 and Q = 1 at t2; ρ(t0)) = tr(Q(t2)P (t1)ρ(t0)P (t1)). (2.6)
6For typographical ease, ‘hats’ will not be placed on operators until it becomes necessary to distin-
guish propositions from the projection operators that represent them.
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Generalising to a sequence of measurements of propositions αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn at times
t1, t2, . . . , tn, the joint probability of finding all the associated properties is
Prob(αt1 = 1 at t1 and αt2 = 1 at t2 and . . .αtn = 1 at tn; ρ(t0)) =
tr(αtn(tn) . . . αt1(t1)ρ(t0)αt1(t1) . . . αtn(tn)) (2.7)
where we have used the relation P 2 = P for a projection operator.
The main assumption of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory
is that, under appropriate conditions, the probability assignment (2.7) is still meaning-
ful for a closed system, with no external observers or associated measurement-induced
state-vector reductions (thus signalling a move from ‘observables’ to ‘beables’). The
satisfaction or otherwise of these conditions is determined by the behaviour of the de-
coherence functional dρ(α, β) which, for the pair of sequences of projection operators
α := (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn) and β := (βt1 , βt2 , . . . , βtn) is defined as
dρ(α, β) := tr(αtn(tn) . . . αt2(t2)αt1(t1)ρ(t0)βt1(t1)βt2(t2) . . . βtn(tn)) = tr(Cαρ(t0)C
†
β)
(2.8)
where
Cα := αtn(tn) . . . αt2(t2)αt1(t1)
= U(t0, tn)αtnU(tn, tn−1) . . . U(t3, t2)αt2U(t2, t1)αt1U(t1, t0) (2.9)
The conditions required for the probability assignments (2.7) to be consistent are sum-
marised below in the (more general) context of the Gell-Mann and Hartle axioms.
It is useful at this point to gather together a number of definitions that are associated
with these ideas.
• A homogeneous history 7) is any time-ordered sequence (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) of pro-
jection operators.
• A homogeneous history β := (β̂t1 , β̂t2 , . . . , β̂tn) is coarser than another history
α := (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) if, for every ti, β̂ti < α̂ti where < denotes the usual ordering
operation on the space of projection operators, i.e., P̂ < Q̂ means that the range
of P̂ is a subspace of the range of Q̂ (this includes the possibility that P̂ = Q̂
so that, in particular, every homogeneous history is trivially coarser than itself).
This relation on the set of homogeneous histories is a partial ordering 8.
• Two homogeneous histories α := (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) and β := (β̂t1 , β̂t2 , . . . , β̂tn) are
disjoint if, for at least one time point ti, β̂ti is disjoint from α̂ti , i.e., the ranges of
these two projection operators are orthogonal subspaces of H.
7The justification of the term ‘homogeneous’ will be given in section 3.2.
8A relation < on a set X is a partial ordering if it satisfies the conditions (i) for all x ∈ X , x < x;
(ii) x < y and y < x implies x = y; and (iii) x < y and y < z implies x < z.
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• The unit history assigns the unit operator to any time t; the null history assigns
the zero operator.
• In calculating a decoherence functional it may be necessary to go outside the class
of homogeneous histories to include inhomogeneous histories. A history of this
type arises as a logical ‘or’ (denoted ∨) operation on a pair of disjoint homoge-
neous histories α := (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) and β := (β̂t1 , β̂t2 , . . . , β̂tn). Such a history
α ∨ β is generally not itself a collection of projection operators 9 (i.e., it is not
homogeneous) but, when computing the decoherence functional, it is represented
by the operator Ĉα∨β := Ĉα + Ĉβ. The coarse-graining relations α < α ∨ β and
β < α∨β are deemed to apply to this disjoint ‘or’ operation. The ‘negation’ oper-
ation ¬ also usually turns a homogeneous history into an inhomogeneous history,
with Ĉ¬α := 1̂− Ĉα.
Note that the collection (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) of projection operators can itself be viewed
as a projection operator on the direct sum ⊕t∈{t1,...,tn}Ht of n copies of the Hilbert space
H, with the copies being labelled by the time values {t1, t2, . . . , tn} at which α is defined.
This idea will be generalised in section 3 with a construction in which every history,
inhomogeneous as well as homogeneous, is represented by a projection operator on a
certain Hilbert space (albeit, not the direct sum ⊕t∈{t1,...,tn}Ht).
2.2 The Gell-Mann and Hartle axioms
The Gell-Mann and Hartle axioms [16] generalise the discussion above by postulating
a new approach to quantum theory in which the notion of ‘history’ is ascribed a fun-
damental role; i.e., a history may be an irreducible entity in its own right that is not
necessarily to be construed as a time-ordered string of single-time propositions. For our
purposes, these axioms and definitions are essentially as follows:
1. The fundamental ingredients in the theory are a space of histories and a space of
decoherence functionals which are complex-valued functions of pairs of histories.
2. The set of histories possesses a partial order < . If α < β then β is said to be coarser
than α, or a coarse-graining of α; dually, α is a finer than β, or a fine-graining of
β . Heuristically this means that α provides a more precise specification than β.
3. There is a notion of two histories α, β being disjoint , written α ⊥ β. Heuristically,
if α ⊥ β then if either α or β is ‘realised’, the other is automatically excluded.
4. There is a unit history 1 (heuristically, the history that is always realised) and a
null history 0 (heuristically, the history that is never realised). For all histories α
we have 0 < α < 1.
9The exception is when α and β differ only in their values αti and βti at a single time point ti. In
this case, if the single-time projection operators αti and βti are disjoint then α ∨ β is equal to α at all
time points except ti, where it is αti + βti . In particular, α ∨ β is still homogeneous.
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5. Two histories α, β that are disjoint can be combined to form a new history α ∨ β
(heuristically, the history ‘α or β’).
6. A set of histories α1, α2, . . . , αN is said to be exclusive if αi ⊥ αj for all i, j =
1, 2, . . . , N . The set is exhaustive (or complete) if it is exclusive and if α1 ∨ α2 ∨
. . . ∨ αN = 1.
7. Any decoherence functional d satisfies the following conditions:
(a) d(0, α) = 0 for all α.
(b) Hermiticity : d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗ for all α, β.
(c) Positivity : d(α, α) ≥ 0 for all α.
(d) Additivity : if α ⊥ β then, for all γ, d(α ∨ β, γ) = d(α, γ) + d(β, γ).
(e) Normalisation: If α1, α2, . . . , αN and β1, β2, . . . , αM are two complete sets of
histories then
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
d(αi, βj) = 1. (2.10)
In standard quantum theory, the definition (2.8) automatically satisfies all these condi-
tions although the discussions in the literature are sometimes a little vague about the
extent to which the conditions apply to histories that are inhomogeneous in addition to
those that are homogeneous.
It is important to note that this axiomatic scheme is given a physical interpretation
only in relation to consistent sets of histories. A complete set C of histories is said to be
(strongly) consistent with respect to a particular decoherence functional d if d(α, β) = 0
for all α, β ∈ C such that α 6= β. Under these circumstances, d(α, α) is given the physical
interpretation as the probability that the history α will be ‘realised’ 10. The Gell-Mann
and Hartle axioms then guarantee that the usual Kolmogoroff probability sum rules will
be satisfied.
The only major difference between the axioms above and those actually given by
Gell-Mann and Hartle is that the latter (i) extend the above to include infinite sums;
and (ii) invoke a notion of ‘fine-grained’ histories. The former may well be desirable
but it first requires defining what is meant by taking a limit of histories; we shall return
briefly to this issue later. A history α is defined to be fine-grained if the only histories β
for which β < α are 0 or α itself. In standard quantum theory, histories of this type arise
as time-ordered sequences of projection operators whose ranges are all one-dimensional
subspaces of the Hilbert space. However, it is not clear whether the existence of such
entities should postulated in general 11 or, if so, what additional properties they should
possess. A particularly advantageous situation is when the space of histories is atomic in
10Deciding on the precise meaning of ‘realised’ is part of the general ontological problem that I wish
to avoid discussing in this particular paper.
11Even in a Hilbert space situation, ‘atoms’ of this type would not be present if we were concentrating
on histories associated with observables whose spectra was purely continuous.
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the sense that there exist so many fine-grained, and disjoint, histories that each history
can be written as a unique ∨-sum of these atoms. In this case, the additivity property
means that the value of a decoherence functional is determined uniquely by its values
on pairs of atoms.
2.3 History filters and temporal supports in standard quantum
logic
We now begin our detailed development of the Gell-Mann and Hartle axioms with the
aim of providing a general quantum-logic theory of histories that incorporates whatever
quasi-temporal properties the system may possess. In what follows, the construction
of such a general scheme will be motivated by the special example of a history version
of standard quantum logic. By this is meant a generalisation of the ideas above in
which strings of projection operators are replaced by strings of single-time propositions
belonging to the lattice L of some ‘standard’ quantum logic theory. The hope is that the
algebraic structure thus revealed will provide valuable clues to what should be postulated
in the general case.
In standard quantum logic the lattice L of single-time propositions is highly struc-
tured. In particular, it is usually required to be complete, 12 orthocomplemented 13,
orthomodular 14, atomic 15 and with the covering property 16. A state on the lattice L
is defined to be a real-valued function µ on L that is a ‘probability measure’ i.e.,
0 ≤ µ(α) ≤ 1 for all α ∈ L, (2.11)
µ(0) = 0 and µ(1) = 1 (2.12)
and the countable additivity property that if α1, α2, . . . is a finite or countable sequence
of elements in L that are pairwise disjoint 17 then the series µ(α1 ∨ α2 ∨ . . .) converges
and
µ(α1 ∨ α2 ∨ . . .) = µ(α1) + µ(α2) + . . . .. (2.13)
Clearly the space R of all states is a real convex set, i.e., if µ and ν are states then so
is rµ+ (1− r)ν for all real r with 0 < r < 1.
One of the main aims of this paper is to find candidates for the ‘history analogues’ of
the lattice L and the state-spaceR of the standard Hamiltonian theory. These analogues
12A lattice is complete if the meet and join operations can be applied to arbitrary subsets of elements.
It is countably complete if this can be done for countable subsets.
13A lattice is orthocomplemented if there is a map α 7→ ¬α with the property that (i) ¬(¬α) = α, (ii)
α < β implies ¬β < ¬α, and (iii) α ∧ ¬α = 0 and α ∨ ¬α = 1.
14A lattice is orthomodular if α < β implies that β = α ∨ (β ∧ ¬α).
15An element α of a lattice is an atom if 0 < β < α implies that β = 0 or β = α. A lattice is atomic
if for any non-zero element β there exists an atom α with α < β.
16An element γ covers β if β < γ and β < δ < γ implies that δ = β or δ = γ. An atomic lattice has
the covering property if for every β and every atom α such that α ∧ β = 0 the element α ∨ β covers β.
17Two propositions α and β are disjoint if α < ¬β.
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of L and R will be a space UP of history-propositions and a space D of decoherence
functionals.
We begin with a careful account of some aspects of the quantum-logic version of the
standard history theory sketched above. Thus we consider a system with a lattice L of
single-time propositions and start by defining a history filter to be any finite 18 collection
(αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn) of single-time propositions αti ∈ L which is time-ordered in the sense
that t1 < t2 < . . . < tn. Thus, in the special case where L is identified with the lattice
P (H) of projection operators on a Hilbert space H, a history filter is what we earlier
called a homogeneous history. However, to distinguish the general situation from the
special case, I will continue to refer to a time-ordered string of projection operators as a
‘homogeneous history’ and reserve the phrase ‘history filter’ for either the quantum-logic
version of standard quantum theory, or for the general quantum-logic theory.
In the case of standard quantum logic, a history filter is a time-labelled version of
what Mittelstaedt and Stachow call a sequential conjunction[24, 39, 40] i.e., it corre-
sponds to the proposition ‘αt1 is true at time t1, and then αt2 is true at time t2, and
then . . . and then αtn is true at time tn’. The phrase ‘history filter’ itself is intended to
capture the idea that each single-time proposition αti in the collection (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn)
serves to ‘filter out’ the properties of the system that are realised in the history of the
universe.
It is important to be able to manipulate history filters that are associated with
different sets of time points. To this end, it is useful to think of a history filter as
something that is defined at every time point but which is ‘active’ only at a finite subset
of points. This can be realised mathematically by defining it to be equal to the trivial
proposition at all but the active points. More precisely, in standard quantum logic we
shall define a history filter α to be an element of the space F(T ,L) of maps from the
space of time points T (in the present case, the real line IR) to the lattice L with the
property that each map is (i) equal nowhere to the null single-time proposition, and (ii)
equal to the unit single-time proposition for all but a finite set of t values. It will be
convenient to append to this space the null history filter which is defined to be the null
single-time proposition at all points t ∈ T . 19
It follows that, in a standard quantum theory realised on a Hilbert space H, a
history filter (i.e., a homogeneous history) is represented by an element α of the space
of functions F(T , P (H)) where α̂t (the value of the map α at t ∈ T ) is equal to the
unit operator for all but a finite set of time points t ∈ T . Objects of this type can be
regarded as projection operators on the weak direct sum F(T ,H) of H-valued functions
on T . 20
18Circumstances might arise where it is necessary to consider infinite collections of propositions. This
is awkward within a purely algebraic formalism but one way of handling this problem will appear later
in section 3.
19It is also sometimes convenient to allow history filters that are equal to the null single-time propo-
sition at one or more time points but are non-null at other points: these are all regarded as equivalent
to the null history.
20The qualification ‘weak’ refers to the fact that the functions v : T → H in F(T ,H) are equal to the
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The first of my suggested axioms for a general history theory is that it should be
based on a space of history filters, but these will no longer just be time-ordered sequences
of single-time propositions. In the context of quantum cosmology, a history filter is a
possible ‘universe’ complete with whatever quasi-temporal attributes it may, or may
not, possess. For this reason, the set of all history filters in the general theory will be
denoted U ; in the case of standard quantum logic we will write U(L) := F(T ,L) to
indicate the underlying lattice L of single-time propositions.
Any quasi-temporal properties of the system should be coded in the mathematical
structure of U . Thus we must decide how the propositional structure of the set of history
filters can be distinguished from that of a set of fixed-time propositions.
The example of standard Hamiltonian quantum theory suggests that the most char-
acteristic property of a history filter is the possibility of dividing it into two sub-histories,
one of which ‘follows’ the other. Conversely, if a history filter β follows another one α,
they can be combined to give a new filter α ◦ β that, pace Mittelstaedt and Stachow,
can be read as ‘history α and then history β’. More precisely, we say that a history
filter β := (βt′
1
, βt′
2
. . . βt′m) follows α := (αt1 , αt2 . . . αtn) if tn < t
′
1, and then define the
combined history α ◦ β as 21
α ◦ β := (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn , βt′1 , βt′2 , . . . , βt′m). (2.14)
It is clear that this operation satisfies the associative law
α ◦ (β ◦ γ) = (α ◦ β) ◦ γ (2.15)
whenever the history filters α, β and γ are so related that both sides of this equation are
well-defined. Thus the space U(L) of history filters in standard quantum logic becomes
a partial semi-group 22 with respect to the combination law ◦.
It is clear that the temporal properties of a history filter α ∈ U(L) are encoded in
the finite set of time points at which it is active; i.e., the points t ∈ T such that αt 6= 1.
This motivates the following definitions:
1. The set of t ∈ T for which αt 6= 1 is called the temporal support , or just support ,
of α ∈ U(L), and is denoted σ(α).
2. The set of all possible temporal supports will be denoted S; in the present case
this is just the set of all finite subsets of T = IR.
null vector in H for all but a finite set of t values. The scalar product between two such vectors v, w is
defined by < v,w >:=
∑
t∈T < vt, wt >H where <,>H denotes the scalar product on the Hilbert space
H.
21A slight variant is to say that β follows α if (i) tn < t
′
1
, or (ii) tn = t
′
1
, in which case we must have
αtn = βt′
1
. Then define α ◦ β by (2.14) if tn < t′1, and by α ◦ β := (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn , βt′
2
, . . . , βt′
m
) if
tn = t
′
1
.
22A set X equipped with a combination law ◦ is a semi-group if the combination is associative, i.e.,
x ◦ (y ◦ x) = (x ◦ y) ◦ z for all x, y, z ∈ X . It is a partial semi-group if the combination law can be
applied only to certain pairs of elements.
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3. The support of the null history is defined to be the empty subset of IR.
Whether or not a history filter β follows another history filter α is determined solely
by their temporal supports. In fact, the space S of supports of standard Hamiltonian
theory can itself be equipped with the structure of a partial semigroup by saying that
the support s2 := {t
′
1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m} follows the support s1 := {t1, t2, . . . , tn} if tn < t
′
1, and
then defining the composition as
s1 ◦ s2 := {t1, t2, . . . , tn, t
′
1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m}. (2.16)
The relation between the partial semi-group structures on U(L) and S is captured
by the observation that the support map σ : U(L) → S is a homomorphism between
these two partial semi-groups, i.e.,
σ(α ◦ β) = σ(α) ◦ σ(β) (2.17)
whenever both sides of the equation are defined.
As a matter of convention we shall define the null support to follow, and preceed,
every element s ∈ S so that α ◦ 0, 0 ◦ α, α ◦ 1 and 1 ◦ α are defined for all α ∈ U(L)
with values α ◦ 0 = 0 = 0 ◦ α and α ◦ 1 = α = 1 ◦ α respectively. Thus the unit history
1 serves as a unit for the semi-group structure of U(L) while the null history 0 is an
absorbing element.
2.4 History filters and temporal supports in the general case
The point of the discussion above is to emphasise that the essential temporal properties
of the space of history filters U(L) in standard Hamiltonian quantum theory is reflected
in its partial semi-group of supports. This raises the possibility of constructing a ‘quasi-
temporal’ theory that is more general than the standard theory and in which the quasi-
temporal stucture is reflected in the structure of the support space; a theory that was
totally ‘non-temporal’ would have a support space equal to a single point.
Thus we postulate that, in the general case, the space U of history filters (i.e.,
possible universes) has the structure of a partial semi-group. If α and β are such that
they can be combined to form α ◦β we shall say that α preceeds β (written as α✁β), or
β follows α. Broadly speaking, the idea is that if β follows α then there is some causal
influence (perhaps, in a rather unusual sense) of events ‘localised’ in the history α on
those localised in β. This concept of ‘following’ is captured in a space S of temporal
supports that is associated with U and which is also a partial semigroup; the two are
related by a homomorphism σ : U → S as in (2.17).
Note that a homomorphism is generally a many-to-one map, and therefore informa-
tion about a history filter α is lost when it is mapped to σ(α) ∈ S. The key idea is that
its image in S just captures the essential information about any quasi-temporal proper-
ties it may possess. This raises the prospect of constructing a tower of semi-groups that
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can interpolate between U and S. Such a tower would be a series of partial semigroups
U1,U2, . . . ,Uk and homomorphisms σi : Ui → Ui+1, with σ0 : U → U1 and σk : Uk → S,
such that the support homomorphism σ : U → S factorises into the finite chain
U
σ0→U1
σ1→U2
σ2→ . . .
σk−1
→ Uk
σk→S. (2.18)
each element of which contains less information than the previous one in the chain.
It should be emphasised that the relation of ‘following’ may not be transitive; i.e.,
α ✁ β and β ✁ γ need not imply that α ✁ γ; in particular, we do not suppose that ✁
is a partial order on U . The reason is that the set of events ‘localised’ in β that are
causally affected by events in α need not include any events that causally affect events
in γ; an explicit example of this phenomenon will appear in the discussion in section 4 of
quantum field theory in a non globally-hyperbolic, curved space-time where the support
structure is different from that of standard Hamiltonian theory. We should also not rule
out the possibility that a history filter may precede itself, or the existence of pairs of
histories α, β such that α✁ β and β ✁ α, leading to a sort of ‘closed time-like loop’.
A more exotic example of a potential support structure is given by the partial semi-
group of cobordism equivalence classes. More precisely, given three closed n-manifolds
Σ1, Σ2 and Σ3, equivalence classes c1 and c2 of cobordisms
23 from Σ1 to Σ2 and Σ2 to
Σ3 respectively can be combined to give a well-defined [23] equivalence class c1 ◦ c2 of
cobordisms from Σ1 to Σ3. If desired, a ‘time-direction’ can be introduced by declaring
one of the pair of boundaries Σ1,Σ2 in a cobordism triple (Σ1,Σ2,M) to be the ‘initial’ n-
space and the other to be the ‘final’ n space, with the requirement that the combination
c1 ◦ c2 of cobordisms is permitted only if the final n-space of c1 is diffeomorphic to
the initial n-space of c2; i.e., this is the condition that c2 follows c1. A temporal-
support structure based on this cobordism operation would be a natural foundation for
a certain type of ‘quantum topology’ theory. This is another example where the relation
of ‘following’ is clearly not transitive. This is shown in Figure 1 where B follows A and
C follows B but C does not follow (i.e., is not cobordant with) A (note that the ‘final’
boundary of C is the empty set.)
It is worth noting in passing that cobordism theory produces a category in which the
objects are closed manifolds and the morphisms are equivalence classes of cobordisms.
In fact, category theory is the most general language within which to discuss temporal
supports. More precisely, the generic model for a space of temporal supports is based on
the morphisms in a category that is small (i.e., the collection of objects is a set rather
than a class); this is also related to the general theory of groupoids [17, 21]. This idea
(in particular, the example of cobordism theory) will be developed in a later paper.
In summary, the discussion above suggests that a general history theory will contain
the following ingredients.
23A cobordism from Σ1 to Σ2 is an n + 1-dimensional manifold M whose boundary is the disjoint
union of submanifolds diffeomorphic to Σ1 and Σ2.
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1. The basic entity in the theory is a partial semi-group U of history filters (i.e.,
possible ‘universes’).
2. There is an associated partial semi-group S of temporal supports with a unit
element ∗ such that s ◦ ∗ = ∗ ◦ s = s for all s ∈ S. A theory with no fundamental
24 temporal properties at all has S = {∗}.
3. There is a null history 0 and a unit history 1, both of whose support is ∗. These
can be combined with any history filter α to give
α ◦ 1 = 1 ◦ α = α (2.19)
and
α ◦ 0 = 0 ◦ α = 0. (2.20)
4. The function σ : U → S that maps a history filter to its support is a homomorphism
of the partial semi-groups. It may be profitable to factorise it as a tower of semi-
groups as in (2.18).
2.5 Nuclear supports and nuclear history filters
In standard quantum theory, any history filter α := (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn) with support
{t1, t2, . . . , tn} can be written as the composition
α = αt1 ◦ αt2 ◦ . . . ◦ αtn (2.21)
in which the single-time proposition αti , i = 1, 2, . . . , n is regarded as a history filter
whose temporal support is the singleton set {ti}.
In a general history theory it is important to know when a history filter can be
decomposed into the product of other filters in an analogous way. The following general
definitions are useful for this purpose.
1. A history filter α ∈ U is nuclear if it cannot be written in the form α = α1◦α2 with
both constituent history filters α1, α2 ∈ U being different from the unit history.
2. A support s ∈ S is nuclear if it cannot be written in the form s = s1 ◦ s2 with
both constituent supports s1, s2 ∈ S being different from the unit support ∗.
3. A decomposition of α of the form α = α1◦α2◦. . . αN is irreducible if the constituent
history filters αi, i = 1 . . . N , are all nuclear.
24Of course, this does not rule out temporal characteristics ‘emerging’ in some coarse-grained sense.
Indeed, any proper theory of quantum gravity may well be of this type.
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Note that, in the decomposition (2.21) in standard quantum theory, the constituents
αti are nuclear histories in the sense above, and {ti} is a nuclear support. Thus, in a
general history theory, a nuclear support can be viewed as a (potentially far-reaching)
analogue of a ‘point of time’ in standard Hamiltonian quantum theory; in particular,
it admits no further temporal-type subdivisions. Similarly, a nuclear history filter is a
general analogue of a single-time proposition.
2.6 The partial ordering and ‘and’ operations on U
If the set of all propositions about the histories of a system is to take on a coherent
algebraic form, it might be expected to be equipped with a lattice structure that is
analogous to the lattice L of single-time propositions in standard quantum theory, and
which interfaces appropriately with the semi-group structure of the space of supports.
Let us analyse the separate operations in turn for the special case of the history version
of standard quantum logic.
The partial ordering on U . In standard quantum theory, a partial ordering can be
defined on the space of history filters by saying that a history filter α ∈ U(L) := F(T ,L)
is finer than a history filter β if, for all time points t ∈ T , we have αt < βt where <
denotes the usual partial-order operation on the lattice L of fixed-time propositions. We
expect such fine- (and coarse-) graining relations to be universal, and therefore postulate
that in any general history theory:
1. the set U of history filters is a partially ordered set;
2. the null and unit filters satisfy 0 < α < 1 for all α ∈ U ;
3. if α ∈ U can be decomposed as α = α1 ◦ α2 then α < α1 and α < α2.
The third requirement is natural if we bear in mind that the heuristic meaning of α < β
is that the proposition that ‘universe α is realised’ contains more information than the
same statement made about β; in particular, the statement that ‘α1 and then α2 is
realised’ contains more information than either of the two statements ‘α1 is realised’, or
‘α2 is realised’, alone.
The ‘and’ operation on U . In standard quantum theory, a natural ‘and’ operation on a
pair of history filters α := (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn) and β := (βt1 , βt2 , . . . , βtn) in U(L) can be
defined by
α ∧ β := ((α ∧ β)t1 , (α ∧ β)t2 , . . . , (α ∧ β)tn) (2.22)
where (α ∧ β)ti := αti ∧ βti is the ‘and’ operation on the lattice L. In the case of a
Hilbert space representation of L as a lattice of projection operators P (H), α̂ti ∧ β̂ti is
defined to be the operator that projects onto the intersection of the ranges of α̂ti and β̂ti .
Heuristically, this says that the system gets through history filter α and history filter β
if, and only if, at each time point it passes the single-time projector in both filters. For
this reason we set α ∧ β = 0 if there is some time point ti such that αti ∧ βti = 0.
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This definition can be extended readily to history filters with different temporal
supports by defining α ∧ β ∈ F(T ,L) as
(α ∧ β)t := αt ∧ βt for all t ∈ T ≃ IR (2.23)
for all α, β ∈ U(L) := F(T ,L). Of course, for most t-values, a history filter is the unit
proposition and, for any single-time proposition P , 1 ∧ P = P ∧ 1 = P .
It is clear from this definition that if β follows α then α◦β = α∧β, and this relation
is one we expect to hold in the general case. Thus the following axiom can be added for
a general history theory:
1. The set U of history filters is equipped with a binary, associative operation called
‘and’ (denoted ∧) such that, heuristically, to say that α∧ β is realised means that
both α and β are realised. This operation is commutative,i.e., α ∧ β = β ∧ α for
all α, β ∈ U .
2. This ‘and’-operation is compatible with the partial-ordering < so that U is a meet
semi-lattice; i.e., α ∧ β is a greatest lower bound for α and β.
3. If β follows α then α ◦ β = α ∧ β.
2.7 The space of history propositions
The next stage is to give a meaning to the negation ¬α or disjunction α ∨ β of history
filters. These operations should possess various familiar properties. For example, the
negation operation should satisfy
¬(¬α) = α (2.24)
and
¬1 = 0, and ¬0 = 1 (2.25)
where 0 and 1 are the null and unit history filters.
Let us start with standard Hamiltonian quantum theory. Note first that the definition
(2.23) is actually the ‘and’ part of the weak direct product
∏
t∈T Lt of copies of the lattice
L indexed by the elements of T . This suggests that we might look at the ‘not’ and ‘or’
operations in this product lattice, which are defined analogously to (2.23) as
(¬α)t := ¬(αt) (2.26)
and
(α ∨ β)t := αt ∨ βt (2.27)
where αt ∨ βt is the usual ‘or’ operation in the lattice L. In an operator realisation
this is the projection onto the closure of the linear span of the ranges of the projection
operators α̂t and β̂t; the negation operation is ¬α̂t = 1̂− α̂t.
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These operations may seem natural but they are not the correct ones for our purposes.
For example, if (a, b) and (c, d) are two history filters with the same support {t1, t2}, the
definition above sets (a, b)∨ (c, d) equal to the history filter (a∨ c, b∨d), which (na¨ıvely)
is true if a or c is true at time t1, and then b or d is true at time t2. In particular, this
would be true if a is true at time t1 and then d is true at time t2, But this corresponds
to the history filter (a, d), whereas what we want to say is that the statement that
‘(a, b) ∨ (c, d) is realised’ means that either the filter (a, b) is realised, or the filter (c, d)
is realised.
Similarly, according to the above, ¬(a, b) = (¬a,¬b) which is true if and only if both
a and b are false, whereas what we are looking for should be true if either a is false or b
is false.
The implication is that the sought-for ‘or’ and ‘not’ operations do not map history
filters into history filters but rather take their values in a larger space of all history
propositions , denoted UP(L). Of course, this conclusion is not new: for example, it is
reflected in the fact that, in the standard representation of α by Ĉα, the history ‘α or β’
for disjoint homogeneous histories α and β is represented by Ĉα+ Ĉβ, which is generally
not a product of projection operators and hence is not a representation of a homogeneous
history; i.e., there is no homogeneous history γ such that Ĉα + Ĉβ = Ĉγ. Similarly, ¬α
is represented by 1̂− Ĉα, which is usually not equal to Ĉβ for any homogeneous history
β.
In summary, the axioms presented so far for the space U and its support space S
suggest that, in the general case, U should be regarded as a subset of a larger space
UP of all history propositions which has the structure of an orthocomplemented lattice.
Notions such as disjointness can then be defined in the usual way. For example, α
is disjoint from β is defined to mean α < ¬β. We would like to know what other
structure UP should have, in particular what type of orthocomplemented lattice it is
(for example: orthomodular, atomic, with the covering property, etc). However, it would
be much easier to speculate on such matters if we had a mathematical model for the
UP-space of standard quantum theory with the property that all the propositions are
represented by projection operators. The next step therefore is to find such a model.
3 An ‘HPO’ Version of Standard Quantum Theory
3.1 A restatement of the main problem
In standard quantum logic, a history filter α is a set (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn) of single-time
propositions. In a Hilbert space realisation, it is a collection (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) of projec-
tion operators that can be regarded as an element of the direct sum ⊕t∈{t1,...,tn}B(H)t of
n copies of the algebra B(H) of bounded operators on the Hilbert space H. As such, it is
itself a projection operator, as is to be desired for a representative of a proposition (the
proposition is that the history α of the universe is ‘realised’). Furthermore, the ‘and’
18
and partial-ordering operations defined in this product lattice have the desired physical
interpretation.
However, as emphasised above, this is not the case for the ‘or’ and ‘not’ operations,
and therefore the theory must be extended from U to a bigger space UP of history
propositions. In the standard approach to history quantum theory, this problem is
solved by noting that, in the computation of the decoherence functional, only the product
operator Ĉα := α̂tn(tn)α̂tn−1(tn−1) . . . α̂t1(t1) is involved and, furthermore, the putative
join α ∨ β of two disjoint homogeneous histories can be represented in this sense as the
sum Ĉα+Ĉβ. From this perspective, it might seem tempting to work always with the Ĉα
operator representative 25 of any homogeneous history α and to perform manipulations
on these objects alone. For example, if β follows α the representative C-operator for
α ◦β is Ĉα◦β = ĈβĈα, and if α and β are disjoint the representative operator is Ĉα∨β :=
Ĉα+ Ĉβ. However, for our purposes, such a procedure has several defects. In particular:
• the map α := (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn) 7→ Ĉα is many-to-one and therefore much infor-
mation about α is lost in the process;
• Ĉα is not a projection operator, and therefore it is not part of the propositional
lattice associated with the Hilbert space H on which it is defined. This makes it
difficult to know what the C-representative is of, for example, α ∨ β when α and
β are not disjoint.
The intention now is to construct a different operator representation of standard
quantum theory in which every history proposition is represented by a genuine projection
operator, thus enabling the whole of UP to be identified with the projection lattice of
some new Hilbert space. For reasons that will become clear later, we are obliged at
this point to restrict our attention to the special case where L = P (H), i.e., we must
work with a normal Hilbert-space based quantum system rather than a general lattice
L. However, the result still strongly reinforces the supposition that, for a general history
theory, the space UP is an ortho-complemented lattice that might be representable by
projection operators. I shall call any such mathematical structure an HPO theory , where
HPO stands for ‘history projection operator’.
3.2 The HPO-theory for standard quantum theory with a fixed
temporal support
If P̂ and Q̂ are projection operators, the product P̂ Q̂ generally fails to be so because,
unless [P̂ , Q̂] = 0, it is neither hermitian nor idempotent. This is why Ĉα is generally
not a projection operator.
25The operator Ĉα depends explicitly on the dynamics of the system because it uses the Heisenberg-
picture operators α̂ti(ti). A dynamics-independent version is the simple product α̂tn α̂tn−1 . . . α̂t1 of the
original Schro¨dinger picture operators α̂ti .
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However, consider instead the tensor product P̂⊗Q̂. The product of operators Â⊗B̂
and Ĉ ⊗ D̂ is defined as (Â ⊗ B̂)(Ĉ ⊗ D̂) := ÂĈ ⊗ B̂D̂, while the adjoint operation is
(Â⊗B̂)† := Â†⊗B̂†. It follows at once that P̂ ⊗Q̂ is a projection operator, and is hence
a candidate to represent the two-time homogeneous history (P̂ , Q̂). More generally, if
we consider the set U{t1,...,tn} of all homogeneous histories with (for the moment) a fixed
support {t1, t2, . . . , tn}, let us represent any such α = (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) with the tensor
product
θ(α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) := α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn (3.1)
which acts on the tensor-product space ⊗t∈{t1 ,...,tn}Ht of n copies of H.
That the tensor product appears in a natural way can be seen from the following
observation. The homogeneous history α := (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) belongs to the direct
sum ⊕t∈{t1,...tn}B(H)t of n-copies of the operator algebra B(H). In constructing the
decoherence functional, the map
(α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) 7→ tr(α̂tn(tn)α̂tn−1(tn−1) . . . α̂t1(t1)B̂) (3.2)
is multilinear with respect to the vector space structure of ⊕t∈{t1,...tn}B(H)t for any B̂ ∈
B(H). However, the fundamental property of the tensor product of a finite collection
of vector spaces V1, V2, . . . , Vn is that any multilinear map µ : V1 × V2 × . . .× Vn → W
to a vector space W factorises uniquely through the tensor product to give the chain of
maps
V1 × V2 × . . .× Vn
θ
→ V1 ⊗ V2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Vn
µ′
→W. (3.3)
Hence the map from α = (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) to α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ α̂tn arises naturally in
the histories approach to standard quantum theory.
The map θ from ⊕t∈{t1,...,tn}B(H)t → ⊗t∈{t1,...,tn}B(H)t is many-to-one since, for
example, (λÂ) ⊗ (λ−1B̂) = Â ⊗ B̂ for all λ ∈ |C, λ 6= 0. However, when restricted to
the subspace
∏
t∈{t1,...,tn} P (H)t ⊂ ⊕t∈{t1 ,...,tn}B(H)t of projection operators, the map is
one-to-one, essentially because if P̂ is a projection operator, λP̂ (λ 6= 0) is such only for
λ = 1. Thus the first observation is that:
• unlike the standard representation with Ĉα, no information about the homogeneous
history (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) is lost by representing it with the tensor product α̂t1 ⊗
α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn ;
• unlike Ĉα, the operator α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn is hermitian and idempotent, i.e., it
is a projection operator.
The key observation is now the following. If P̂ and Q̂ are projection operators on H
then P̂ ⊗ Q̂ is a projection operator on H ⊗ H. Furthermore, if P̂ and Q̂ are disjoint
(i.e., if P̂ Q̂ = Q̂P̂ = 0) then P̂ + Q̂ is a projection operator on H. Now suppose
that P̂ and Q̂ are disjoint projection operators on H, as are the pair R̂ and Ŝ; hence
P̂ Q̂ = Q̂P̂ = 0 = R̂Ŝ = ŜR̂. Then (P̂ ⊗ R̂)(Q̂⊗ Ŝ) = P̂ Q̂⊗ R̂Ŝ = 0 = (Q̂⊗ Ŝ)(P̂ ⊗ R̂)
and hence P̂ ⊗ R̂ and Q̂⊗ Ŝ are disjoint projection operators on H⊗H (actually, it is
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sufficient that just one of the pairs (P̂ , Q̂) and (R̂, Ŝ) is disjoint). It follows that their
sum P̂ ⊗ R̂ + Q̂ ⊗ Ŝ is also a projection operator on H ⊗H. In fact, using the lattice
structure on P (H⊗H) we get
P̂ ⊗ R̂ ∨ Q̂⊗ Ŝ = P̂ ⊗ R̂ + Q̂⊗ Ŝ (3.4)
which looks remarkably like the Ĉα + Ĉβ construction we are trying to emulate.
What this example illustrates is that not all projection operators onH⊗H are simply
tensor products of projection operators on H. Those that are, are normally called ho-
mogeneous ; the remainder are inhomogeneous and include certain sums of homogeneous
operators.
The general strategy is now clear. With the aid of the map θ, the operator rep-
resentation
∏
t∈{t1,...tn} P (H)t of the space of homogeneous histories U{t1,...,tn} with tem-
poral support {t1, t2, . . . , tn} is embedded in the space P (⊗t∈{t1,...,tn}Ht) of projection
operators on the Hilbert space ⊗t∈{t1 ,...,tn}Ht. The space P (⊗t∈{t1,...,tn}Ht) carries the
usual lattice structure of projection operators and is therefore a natural model for the
space UP{t1,...,tn} of history propositions based on homogeneous histories with support
{t1, t2, . . . , tn}. In this model, history filters/homogeneous histories are represented by
homogeneous projectors, and a general history proposition is represented by an inho-
mogeneous projector. This explains why the collection (α̂t1 , α̂t2 , . . . , α̂tn) was refered to
earlier as a ‘homogeneous’ history.
In this approach, decoherence functionals will be computed with the aid of the map
D : ⊗t∈{t1 ,...,tn}B(H)→ B(H) defined by
D(Â1 ⊗ Â2 ⊗ . . . Ân) := Ân(tn)Ân−1(tn−1) . . . Â1(t1) (3.5)
on homogeneous operators and then extended by linearity. Thus, on a homogeneous
history α ∈ U{t1,...,tn}, the C-map is defined by
Ĉα := D(θ(α)) (3.6)
and then extended by linearity to the set of inhomogeneous histories with support
{t1, t2, . . . , tn}.
3.3 The missing logical connectives
The natural lattice structure on P (⊗t∈{t1,...,tn}Ht) can be used to define the missing
negation and ‘or’ operations on UP. For example, in a general lattice of projection
operators, the projection operator corresponding to the proposition ¬P̂ is 1̂−P̂ . Hence, if
R̂ and Ŝ are projection operators on the Hilbert space H, the negation of the proposition
represented by the projection operator R̂⊗ Ŝ on H⊗H is just
¬(R̂ ⊗ Ŝ) = 1̂− R̂⊗ Ŝ (3.7)
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and so, using the D-map defined in (3.5), we get D(¬(R̂⊗ Ŝ)) = 1̂− ŜR̂. Thus, for the
homogeneous history α ∈ U{t1,...,tn}, (3.5–3.6) give
Ĉ¬α = 1̂− α̂tn(tn)α̂tn−1(tn−1) . . . α̂t1(t1) (3.8)
in accord with the usual identification made in work on decohering histories.
If α and β are disjoint homogeneous histories with the same support {t1, t2, . . . , tn}
then, according to the philosophy above, the history proposition α∨ β is represented by
the sum θ(α) + θ(β) = α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn + β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ β̂tn , and so
Ĉα∨β := D(θ(α)∨θ(β)) = D(α̂t1⊗ α̂t2⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn + β̂t1⊗ β̂t2⊗ . . .⊗ β̂tn) = Ĉα+ Ĉβ (3.9)
as required. However, we can now describe the C-representation of the proposition
α ∨ β when α and β are not disjoint. It is simply the image under the map D :
⊗t∈{t1,...tn}B(H)→ B(H) of the projection operator θ(a) ∨ θ(b), i.e., of the operator on
⊗t∈{t1,...tn}H that projects onto the smallest closed subspace containing the images of
the projection operators θ(α) = α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn and θ(β) = β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ β̂tn .
There are situations other than disjointness in which this operator can be written in
a simple form. For example, if P̂ and Q̂ are projection operators that commute, but are
not disjoint, then it is a standard result that P̂ ∨ Q̂ = P̂ + Q̂− P̂ Q̂. Now suppose that
(α̂t1 , α̂t2) and (β̂t1 , β̂t2) are a pair of homogeneous histories with support {t1, t2} (two
time points for simplicity only) and which are such that [α̂t1 , β̂t1 ] = 0 = [α̂t2 , β̂t2 ]. Then
the tensor-product projection operators α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 and β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2 also commute, and hence
α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ∨ β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2 = α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 + β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2 − (α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2)(β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2)
= α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 + β̂t1 ⊗ β̂t2 − α̂t1 β̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 β̂t2 (3.10)
so that
Ĉα∨β = α̂t2(t2)α̂t1(t1) + β̂t2(t2)β̂t1(t1)− α̂t2(t2)β̂t2(t2)α̂t1(t1)β̂t1(t1) (3.11)
which, perhaps, is not such an obvious result.
Note that the tensor product structure is well-adapted to discuss the sequential-logic
operations introduced by MittelStaedt [24] and Stachow [39]. For example, a simple,
time-labelled, sequential disjunction is of the form ‘proposition P at time t1 or then
proposition Q at time t2’, denoted P ⊔Q. In terms of history filters, the proposition ‘P
at time t1’ says nothing about time t2 and is therefore represented by the tensor product
operator P̂ ⊗ 1̂. Similarly, the proposition ‘Q at time t2’, says nothing about t1, and is
therefore represented by the operator 1̂⊗ Q̂. Thus, the sequential disjunction P ⊔Q can
be identified with the operator P̂ ⊗ 1̂ ∨ 1̂⊗ Q̂.
Now, even if P̂ and Q̂ do not commute, we still have [P̂ ⊗ 1̂, 1̂⊗ Q̂] = 0 and hence
P̂ ⊗ 1̂ ∨ 1̂⊗ Q̂ = P̂ ⊗ 1̂ + 1̂⊗ Q̂− (P̂ ⊗ 1̂)(1̂⊗ Q̂) = P̂ ⊗ 1̂ + 1̂⊗ Q̂− P̂ ⊗ Q̂ (3.12)
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so that, under the C map, we get
ĈP⊔Q = P̂ + Q̂− Q̂P̂ (3.13)
in agreement with Stachow’s result.
Similarly, the sequential conjunction ‘P at time t1 and then Q at time t2’ (denoted
P ⊓Q) is represented by P̂ ⊗ 1̂∧ 1̂⊗ Q̂ which is equal to P̂ ⊗ Q̂,i.e., the image under θ of
the history filter (P,Q). Thus, in the case of standard quantum theory, a sequential con-
junction (with temporal labels) is indeed the same thing as a history filter/homogeneous
history.
Finally, it is now clear why we had to restrict our attention at the beginning of this
section to the special case L = P (H). This is because it is not possible to give a sensible
definition of the tensor product of a general lattice L with itself; a well-known problem
in standard quantum logic.
3.4 The HPO-theory for general supports
The theory developed above works well but, as it stands, it applies only to homogeneous
histories with a fixed temporal support {t1, t2, . . . , tn} and to those general history propo-
sitions that can be derived from them. To incorporate arbitrary supports we need to
collect together the operator algebras ⊗t∈sB(H)t for all supports s ∈ S. The natural
way of doing this is to use an infinite tensor product of copies of B(H).
Let Ω denote a family of unit vectors in the Cartesian product
∏
t∈T Ht of copies of
H labelled by the time values t ∈ T ; i.e., Ω is a map from T to the unit sphere in H.
Recall that the infinite tensor product ⊗Ωt∈THt based on Ω is defined to be the set of
functions v : T → H with the property that v(t) = Ω(t) for all but a finite number of
t-values. The set of all such functions is given the usual point-wise vector space structure
by defining (av+bw)(t) := av(t)+bw(t), a, b ∈ |C, v, w ∈ ⊗Ωt∈THt, and the scalar product
is
< v,w >:=
∏
t∈T
< v(t), w(t) >H (3.14)
where <,>H is the inner product on the Hilbert space H. The right hand side of (3.14)
is well defined because only a finite number of terms contribute to the product. It is a
standard result that the resulting space is a Hilbert space [12].
An infinite tensor product ⊗Ωt∈TB(H)t of operator algebras B(H) is naturally asso-
ciated with this new vector space. It is defined to be the weak closure (i.e., the closure
in the weak operator topology) of the set of all functions from T to B(H) that are equal
to the unit operator for all but a finite set of t-values. This definition is geared perfectly
to accomodate arbitrary temporal supports, and therefore the set of all projection op-
erators in ⊗Ωt∈TB(H)t can be taken as a model for the complete space UP of history
propositions in a standard Hilbert-space based, quantum theory. Elements of the sub-
space U of history filters are identified with the homogeneous projection operators in
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⊗Ωt∈TB(H)t, i.e., functions from T to P (H) that are equal to the unit operator for all
but a finite set of t-values.
Note that use of the weak closure in forming the complete space ⊗Ωt∈TB(H)t provides
a precise way of giving meaning to a history with an infinite set of projection operators:
it is the weak limit of a convergent sequence of homogeneous histories with finite support.
3.5 Group actions on the HPO space
An interesting insight into the possible role of group theory in the general history formal-
ism can be obtained by looking at what happens in the HPO form of standard quantum
theory. Thus let R : T → B(H) be any map whose value in B(H) is the unit operator
on H for all but the finite set of time values in some support s = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}. Then
R(s) := Rt1 ⊗Rt2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Rtn (3.15)
is a well-defined operator on the tensor product space ⊗Ωt∈THt. Now suppose we are
given such a map s 7→ R(s) for each s ∈ S. Then it is a trivial consequence of definition
(3.15) that if s′ := {t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m} is another support that follows s (i.e., tn < t
′
1) then
R(s)R(s′) = R(s ◦ s′). (3.16)
Thus the map s 7→ R(s) is a representation of the semi-group S on the HPO Hilbert
space.
Now suppose that each Rti is a unitary operator on H. Then the associated operator
R(s) is a unitary operator on ⊗Ωt∈THt, and hence, for any history filter α (with arbitrary
temporal support), the map
α̂t′
1
⊗ α̂t′
2
⊗ . . .⊗ α̂t′m 7→ R(s)α̂t′1 ⊗ α̂t′2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂t′mR(s)
−1 (3.17)
maps the homogeneous projector α̂t′
1
⊗ α̂t′
2
⊗ . . .⊗ α̂t′m into another such. This extends
to a map of inhomogeneous projectors, and in such a way that the lattice structure of
the history propositions is preserved. Thus, in the unitary case, the map s 7→ R(s)
provides a representation of the semi-group S as automorphisms of the lattice of his-
tory propositions. This suggests very strongly that, in the general case, an important
role will be played by representations of the semi-group of supports S in the group of
automorphisms of the lattice UP.
Note that, in standard quantum theory, a very special example is the choice Rt :=
e−itH/h¯. In this case, the tensor product α̂t1(t1)⊗ α̂t2(t2)⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn(tn) of Heisenberg-
picture projectors can be obtained from the product α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn of Schro¨dinger
operators by the transform
α̂t1(t1)⊗ α̂t2(t2)⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tn(tn) = U(s)α̂t1 ⊗ α̂t2 ⊗ . . .⊗ α̂tnU(s)
−1 (3.18)
where s := {t1, t2, . . . , tn} and Ut := e
−itH/h¯. This suggests that, in the general case, if an
HPO representation can be found situations may arise in which a quasi-temporal type
of dynamical evolution, together with an associated Heisenberg picture, can be achieved
with the aid of a special operator representation of S.
24
3.6 The general axioms for history propositions
Motivated by the above we can now give a provisional form of the expanded set of history
axioms towards which we have been working. These should be viewed as a more detailed
version of the original Gell-Mann and Hartle axioms and, hopefully, could be used as a
basis for a general analysis of quantum gravity theories in which the standard notions
of continuous time and space need not be fundamental ingredients. The general axioms
and definitions are as follows.
H1. The space of history filters. The fundamental ingredient in a theory of histories is a
space U of history filters , or possible universes . This space has the following structure.
1. U is a partially-ordered set with a unit history filter 1 and a null history filter 0
such that 0 < α < 1 for all α ∈ U ;
2. U has a meet operation ∧ which combines with the partial order < to form a meet
semi-lattice with unit 1 so that 1 ∧ α = α for all α ∈ U . The null history is
absorptive in the sense that 0 ∧ α = 0 for all α ∈ U .
3. U is a partial semi-group with composition law denoted ◦. If α, β ∈ U can be
combined to give α ◦ β ∈ U we say that β follows α, or α preceeds β, and write
α✁ β. The ◦ and ∧ laws are compatible in the sense that if α ◦ β is defined then
it is equal to α ∧ β.
4. The null and unit histories can always be combined with any history filter α to
give
α ◦ 1 = 1 ◦ α = α (3.19)
α ◦ 0 = 0 ◦ α = 0. (3.20)
H2. The space of temporal supports. Any quasi-temporal properties of the system are
encoded in a partial semi-group S of supports with unit ∗. The support space has the
following properties.
1. There is a semi-group homomorphism σ : U → S that assigns a support to each
history filter. The support of 0 and 1 is defined to be ∗ ∈ S.
2. A history filter α is nuclear if it has no non-trivial decomposition of the form
α = β ◦ γ, β, γ ∈ U ; a temporal support s is nuclear if it has no non-trivial
decomposition of the form s = s1 ◦ s2, s1, s2 ∈ S. Nuclear supports are the
analogue of points of time; nuclear history filters are the analogue of single-time
propositions.
A decomposition of α ∈ U as α = α1 ◦α2 ◦ . . . ◦αN is irreducible if the constituent
history filters αi ∈ U , i = 1, 2, . . . , N are all nuclear.
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3. A resolution of the semi-group homomorphism σ : U → S is a chain of semigroups
Ui and semi-group homomorphisms σi so that σ factors as the composition
U
σ0→U1
σ1→U2
σ2→ . . .
σk−1
→ Uk
σk→S. (3.21)
H3. The space of history propositions. The space U of history filters is embedded in
a larger space UP of history propositions . This space is a ortho-complemented lattice
with a structure that is consistent with the semi-lattice structure on the subspace U .
One may also require the lattice to be countably complete, or even complete, depending
on its cardinality. In addition:
1. The space UP can be generated from U by the application of a finite (or, perhaps,
countably infinite) number of ¬, ∨ and ∧ lattice operations. This captures the
idea that elements of UP represent propositions ‘about’ history filters (i.e., about
possible universes).
2. An important role may be played by representations of the partial semi-group S
in the automorphism group of the lattice UP.
3. Any representation of the ortho-complemented lattice UP by projection operators
on a Hilbert space is called an HPO quantisation of the system. In such a quanti-
sation, some of the automorphisms mentioned above might be implemented with
unitary transformations.
4. Two history propositions α and β are said to be disjoint , denoted α ⊥ β, if
α < ¬β. A set of history propositions {α1, α2, . . . , αN} is exclusive if its elements
are pairwise disjoint. It is exhaustive (or complete) if α1 ∨ α2 ∨ . . . ∨ αN = 1.
Countable sets (i.e., with N =∞) are permitted where appropriate.
H4. The space of decoherence functionals. A decoherence functional is a complex-
valued map of pairs of history propositions; the set of all such maps is denoted D. Any
decoherence functional has the following properties:
1. The ‘inner-product’ type conditions:
• Hermiticity : d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗ for all α, β ∈ UP.
• Positivity : d(α, α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ UP.
• Null triviality : d(0, α) = 0 for all α ∈ UP.
2. Conditions related to the potential probabilistic interpretation:
• Additivity : if α ⊥ β are general history propositions then, for all γ ∈ UP,
d(α ∨ β, γ) = d(α, γ) + d(β, γ).
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• Normalisation 26 : d(1, 1) = 1
3. There may be a natural topology on UP such that each decoherence functional
d ∈ D is a continuous 27 function of its arguments.
H5. The physical interpretation of these axioms is the same as that of the Gell-Mann
and Hartle axioms, i.e., the diagonal element d(α, α) is interpreted as the probability of
the history proposition α being ‘true’ when α is part of a consistent set. If this is not
the case, no direct physical meaning is ascribed to the real number d(α, α).
The axioms above might be tightened or relaxed in a variety of ways; certainly one
would not wish to be too pedantic at this stage of the development. For example, Dowker
and Halliwell [5] have pointed out that the decoherence functional (2.8) in standard
Hamiltonian quantum theory obeys the Schwarz-type inequality
|d(α, β)| ≤ d(α, α)
1
2d(β, β)
1
2 (3.22)
for all history filters α and β. This might be a good candidate for inclusion as an extra
axiom in the case of a general history theory. Note that it renders the ‘null triviality’
axiom redundant.
In normal quantum theory, the lattice L of propositions is not only complete and
ortho-complemented: it is also orthomodular, atomic and with the covering property.
Each of these properties has a direct physical implication, and it is therefore a matter of
some interest to explore the extent to which they should also be imposed on the lattice
UP of history theory.
In this context it is appropriate to recall the powerful representation theorems that
assert that any complete, orthomodular atomic lattice with the covering property (and
of length ≥ 4) can be realised as the lattice of closed subspaces of a vector space V
equipped with a hermitian form [36], [2]. If the field over which V is defined is the real,
complex or quaternionic numbers then, under a minor continuity requirement on the
involution operator (complex conjugation in the complex case), V is a Hilbert space.
It follows that if the space UP of history propositions is a lattice of this type, it can
be realised as the lattice P (V) of projection operators on some Hilbert space V, i.e.,
an ‘HPO-theory’ necessarily exists. Of course, the HPO-Hilbert space V need not be
anything like the tensor-product structure defined above for standard quantum theory;
clearly, this will depend on the properties of the temporal supports. On the other hand,
if either the orthomodular or the atomicity condition is absent the possibility arises of
finding mathematical models that are not connected with Hilbert spaces at all. This is
an intriguing topic for further research.
26This condition, plus additivity, implies that if α1, α2, . . . , αN and β1, β2, . . . , βN are two complete
sets of history propositions then
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 d(α
i, βj) = 1. In the infinite case one may wish to extend
this to allow both N and M to be infinite.
27Such a condition holds in standard quantum theory because of the result that Â 7→ tr(ÂB̂) is a
weakly continuous function on bounded subsets of B(H) for each trace-class operator B̂.
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3.7 The non-applicability of Gleason’s theorem to the HPO-
theory
We have seen that all propositions about histories in standard Hamiltonian quantum
theory can be represented by projection operators on the Hilbert space V of the HPO-
theory. It is instructive to see how Gleason’s theorem [10] looks in this context.
Let µ be any state on the lattice P (H) of projection operators on a Hilbert space
H, i.e., µ is a real-valued function on P (H) that satisfies the axioms (2.11–2.13). Then
Gleason showed that, if Dim(H) > 3, there exists a density matrix ρµ on H such that,
for all α ∈ P (H),
µ(α) = tr(ρµα) (3.23)
which, of course, is the familiar expression for the probability in standard quantum
theory.
Gleason’s theorem is important because it sharply limits the ways in which the
quantum-logical structure contained in the pair (L,R) can be represented in concrete
mathematical terms. More precisely, if the lattice of propositions L is postulated to
be the projection lattice P (H) of some Hilbert space H, then Gleason’s theorem shows
that the states must necessarily be of the standard form (3.23). Thus, to construct a
non-standard type of quantum theory in which states are still additive on all pairs of
disjoint propositions it is necessary to start with a model for L that is not the projection
lattice of a Hilbert space.
Consider now the case where V is the Hilbert space of a general HPO theory, i.e., the
set of history propositions UP is represented by the lattice P (V) of projection operators
on V. Each decoherence functional d ∈ D defines a real-valued map µd on UP by
µd(α) := d(α, α). This certainly satisfies the first two requirements (2.11–2.12) of an
abstract state and therefore, if this map was additive on all complete sets of history
propositions, Gleason’s theorem would imply that it is necessarily given by a density
matrix acting on V via (3.23). Under these circumstances, it would be rather difficult
to tell the difference between a history theory and a normal (single-time) theory.
However, the central idea behind the notion of consistent histories is precisely that
the decoherence functional is not additive in this sense, i.e., even if the histories α and β
are disjoint, µd(α∨β) = d(α∨β, α∨β) may not equal µd(α)+µd(β) = d(α, α)+d(β, β).
In fact, this is generally the case since additivity applies only to the special subsets of
‘consistent’ histories. Thus Gleason’s theorem is not applicable, and so it is feasible to
seek decoherence functionals on P (V) that are something other than density matrices
on V. Indeed, this feature is exploited already in standard quantum theory since the
decoherence functional d(α, β) := tr(Ĉαρ̂Ĉ
†
β) cannot be written in terms of a density
matrix on the HPO-Hilbert space ⊗Ωt∈THt.
This suggests rather strongly that interesting general history theories might be con-
structed by postulating the space of history propositions UP to be the projection lattice
P (V) of some Hilbert space V, and then to look for decoherence functionals whose di-
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agonal elements are not density matrices on V. For this reason it is of considerable
importance to see what can be said in general about the space of decoherence function-
als associated with the projection lattice of a Hilbert space. This is another topic for
future research.
4 Quantum Field Theory in a Curved Space-time
The application of consistent histories to quantum field theory was discussed by Blencowe
[3] in the case of a scalar field φ propagating on a four-dimensional manifold M with a
globally-hyperbolic metric γ. Global hyperbolicity guarantees the existence of a global
time function that can be used to foliate M into a one-parameter family, t 7→ Σt,
of spacelike hypersurfaces Σt of M. Blencowe defined a history to be a collection of
propositions about the values of a sequence Ati , i = 1, 2, . . . , n of observables where Ati
is localised in a bounded open subset Oti of Σti ; these regions can be time-ordered by
requiring t1 < t2 < . . . < tn. Thus the global hyperbolicity of γ is used to reduce the
problem to something resembling standard Hamiltonian quantum theory.
A more space-time oriented approach was suggested by Hartle [14] who emphasised
the importance of observables regarded as averages of field variables over space-time
regions. The causal structure involved is related to ideas of Sorkin [38] about state-
vector reduction in relativistic quantum theory. Other significant work in this area is
the general study by Mittelstaedt, and by Mittelstaedt and Stachow [27, 26, 29, 28], of
‘relativistic quantum logic’: a quantum-logical version of the ideas of space-time localised
observables that are much used in C∗-algebra approaches to quantum field theory.
My aim here is to show briefly how the ideas of Hartle and Sorkin lead naturally to
a nice example of a ‘temporal support’ in a quasi-temporal situation. A lot more could
be said about the quantum field theoretical aspects of the theory, but this is deferred to
another occasion
We start with a pair (M, γ) where the Lorentzian metric γ is not required to be
globally hyperbolic (this is one part of the ‘quasi-temporal’ aspect of the system). The
basic propositions in the theory will be of the form that the smeared field φ(f) lies in
some subset I of IR where f is smooth test function on M (this proposition will be
denoted P (f, I)). The ‘history’ concept comes in via the idea of looking at a collection
of such propositions in which the supports of the test-functions concerned are localised
in space-time regions that are causally related in some way.
To facilitate this idea, let us say that a subset A ⊂ M preceeds another subset
B ⊂M, denoted A ≺ B, if
A
⋂
B = ∅, (4.1)
J+(A)
⋂
B 6= ∅ (4.2)
and
J+(B)
⋂
A = ∅ (4.3)
where the chronological future J+(A) of A is defined as usual to be the set of points in
M that can be reached from A by future-directed, non space-like curves. The purpose
of (4.3) is to avoid a situation like that shown in Figure 2 where A and B can each
causally affect the other.
As emphasised by Sorkin [38], the relation ≺ is not a partial ordering; in particular,
A ≺ B and B ≺ C does not necessarily imply that A ≺ C. This is because the points
in B that causally influence C (i.e., {b ∈ B | J+(b)
⋂
C 6= ∅}) may not lie in that part
of B (B
⋂
J+(A)) that intersects the causal future J+(A) of A. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.
The basic idea of the history formalism for this theory is that an ‘elementary’ history
filter is a set of propositions P (fi, Ii), i = 1, 2, . . . , n in which the support of each fi
is compact (so that the proposition is localised in the space-time M) and connected .
Propositions involving regions that are disconnected can be built up from propositions
localised in connected regions. This motivates the following definitions.
1. An open subset A ⊂M is a basic region ofM if A is connected and has a compact
closure.
2. A temporal support is a collection s = {O1, O2, . . . , On} of basic regions Oi whose
closures are non-intersecting, and which are such that, for each pair Oi, Oj ∈ s,
either (i) Oi ≺ Oj, or (ii) Oj ≺ Oi, or (iii) Oi and Oj are space-like separated.
3. A temporal support s′ := {O′1, O
′
2, . . . , O
′
m} is said to follow another such s :=
{O1, O2, . . . , On}, denoted s✁ s
′, if (i) the closures of the basic regions in s and s′
are pairwise disjoint, and (ii)
⋃n
i=1Oi ≺
⋃m
j=1O
′
j.
If s✁ s′, a semi-group combination law is defined as
s ◦ s′ := {O1, O2, . . . , On, O
′
1, O
′
2, . . . , O
′
m} (4.4)
4. A history filter is a collection of propositions P (f1, I1), P (f2, I2) . . . , P (fn, In) where
the support of the test function fi, i = 1, . . . , n is the closure of the element Oi of
a temporal support {O1, O2, . . . , On}.
If α, β are history filters with σ(α) ✁ σ(β), then α ◦ β is defined as the union of
the collections of propositions contained in α and in β.
Note that if a temporal support s is nuclear, (i.e., if it cannot be written in the
form s1 ◦ s2) then no Oi ∈ s can proceed or follow any other Oj ∈ s. Thus each Oi
in s must be space-like separated from every other one. Thus the role of a ‘time-point’
is played by any finite collection of disjoint basic regions that are space-like separated
from each other. It is clear that every temporal support s can be written in the form
s = s1◦s2◦ . . .◦sN where si, i = 1 . . .N are nuclear sets. This means that the time space
T (defined to be the collection of all possible nuclear temporal supports) can serve the
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same role here as did the real numbers in our earlier discussion of standard Hamiltonian
quantum theory. In particular, an HPO theory can be constructed in which the most
general history proposition is represented as a projection operator on the Hilbert space
⊗Ωτ∈THτ .
The computation of decoherence functionals follows the same line as that discussed
by Hartle [14] and by Sorkin [38]. Specifically, in constructing the C-representation of a
history filter, if test-functions fi and fj have supports associated with basic regions Oi
and Oj with Oi ≺ Oj, then the projection operators representing the basic propositions
P (fi, Ii) and P (fj, Ij) must appear in the order P̂ (fj , Ij)P̂ (fi, Ii). If Oi and Oj are space-
like separated then no order for the operators P̂ (fi, Ii) and P̂ (fj , Ij) can be specified,
which is consistent only if they commute. So this is the point at which microcausality
enters the history version of quantum field theory in a curved space-time.
Specific quantum field theoretic problems will not be addressed here but it should
be noted that the approach discussed above does not help with the difficult problem
of deciding how concrete theories should actually be constructed. The basic problem
is that, viewed canonically, a quantum field theory admits many unitarily inequivalent
representations of the canonical commutation relations, and some way is needed to select
the specific one that is deemed to be of physical relevance. In the case of quantum field
theory in a curved space-time (M, γ), there is no universal way of doing this unless γ
admits a time-like Killing vector. The analogue in the histories formalism arises when one
tries to construct projection operators like P̂ (f, I). Specifically, there will exist infinitely
many unitarily inequivalent representations of the lattice structure of UP formed from
a particular HPO-theory.
5 Conclusions
We have argued that the collection UP of all history propositions in a general history
theory can be equipped with a lattice structure that is similar in some respects to the
lattice of propositions in standard quantum logic. Any quasi-temporal properties of the
theory are coded in the space S of supports associated with the subspace U of history
filters. The support space can be quite exotic, as shown by the cobordism example
mentioned briefly in section 2.4. Of course, a Boolean lattice would correspond to a
history version of a classical theory, and quantum-mechanical superselection rules would
arise in the usual way via the existence of a non-trivial center for the lattice UP.
We have also seen how an ‘HPO-theory’ exists for standard quantum theory in which
every history proposition can be represented as a projection operator on a certain Hilbert
space. This provides valuable clues about the possible lattice structure on UP in the
general case and opens the possibility for novel 28 concepts. It also suggests that useful
quantum history theories can be obtained using the lattice of projection operators P (V)
28For example, the lattice structure on UP can be used to provide a notion of two history propositions
commuting [2].
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on some Hilbert space V as a model for UP, with a support space S attached in some
way.
It is clear that much work remains to be done to develop these ideas into a fully
effective tool. Some of the major topics are as follows:
The structure of the space D of decoherence functionals . Very little has been said in
this paper about the mathematical structure of the space of decoherence functionals,
but this is clearly of great importance. In standard quantum logic, the analogue of D is
the space R of states/probability measures on the lattice L of single-time propositions.
Much has been written about how the structures of R and L intertwine, and a similar
analysis should be done for D and UP.
Another intriguing issue concerns the use of complex numbers. The only number
system that plays a basic role in standard quantum logic is the set of real numbers
in which states take their values. Indeed, one of the original reasons for interest in
the quantum logic programme was a hope that it would clarify the extent to which
the complex number field is, or is not, an essential ingredient in quantum theory. The
conclusion there was that complex numbers are not essential, but we have forced them
on the history formalism by requiring decoherence functionals to be complex valued.
The question arises therefore of whether the axioms for decoherence functionals can be
changed so that complex numbers do not play such a fundamental role.
A history analogue of the canonical commutation relations. The canonical commuta-
tion relations play an important role in standard Hilbert-space based quantum theory.
They arise as the Lie algebra of a group of transformations (the Weyl group) of classical
phase space and provide the special class of classical observables that can be assigned
self-adjoint operator status in such a way that Poisson brackets go into operator commu-
tators. More generally, any classical system with a state space that admits a transitive
group of symplectic transformations G can be quantised by looking for irreducible, uni-
tary representations of G; the associated self-adjoint representation of the Lie algebra
L(G) then provides the preferred class of quantum observables. 29
It is of considerable interest to ask what is the history analogue of a canonical group.
In standard quantum theory on a Hilbert space H a unitary representation of G onH in-
duces a G action on P (H); irreducibility of the representation is equivalent to the action
on P (H) having no fixed points. This idea can be generalised to the space F (T , P (H))
of history filters by studying the action on this space of the ‘gauged’ canonical group
F (T , G) (cf the discussion in section 3.5). In particular, this suggests the idea of a ‘pre-
ferred class’ of history filters in which the constituent single-time projection operators
all belong to the spectral resolutions of the Lie algebra of G. A detailed study of this
example could lead to a group-theoretic approach to the actual construction of general
history theories. Of course, the notion of a symmetry group will also have a natural
29This is thinking of a canonical group as a route for quantising a classical system. Another aspect
is the uncertainty relations that are associated with the commutators of the generators of L(G). This
has been discussed in depth recently by Halliwell and Anderson [1, 13] for the case of the Weyl group.
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translation into history terms.
Topological aspects of quantum theory in a history formalism. It is intriguing to wonder
how the familiar topological properties of standard quantum theory translate into the
history formalism, and whether any of them continue to be of significance in a more
general history theory. For example, in the quantum version of a classical system with
configuration space Q, different flat, complex vector bundles over Q lead to inequivalent
quantisations. Such bundles are classified by the group Hom(pi1(Q), U(n)) of U(n)-
valued homomorphisms of the fundamental group pi1(Q) of Q. How is this structure
reflected in the structure of the space of history propositions? Similarly, how does the
famous Berry phase appear in a history formalism? These questions may, or may not, be
related to the separate issue of whether the spaces U and UP should be given topological
structures in their own right and, if so, what role this plays in the general theory.
The use of alternative algebraic structures. The discussion in this paper has been within
the context of quantum logic,i.e., the major mathematical tools are to be drawn from the
theory of non-distributive lattices. However, in conventional quantum theory other types
of algebraic structure have been employed to great effect, and it is important to see if
these can be adapted to the general history formalism. A relatively mild example would
be to replace the use of projection operators with the more general positive-operator-
valued measures that have been much used in recent discussions of the measurement
problem in quantum theory [4]. A more striking challenge would be to find a C∗-algebra
analogue of the general axioms presented in this paper.
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